

TOPIC	7
Definitions	8
Definition of Political Conditionality /Good Governance	9
Definition of Humanitarian Assistance	10
STATUS QUO	11
Aid Subject to Political Conditionality Now	12
Current US Assistance Conditioned on Good Governance	13
Aid Conditionality Inevitable	14
Aid Conditionality Growing	15
“Normal Means” is Aid Conditionality	16
Aid Not Subject to Political Conditionality Now	17
Current Aid to Middle East Not Conditioned	18
Aid Conditionality Declining.....	19
International Conditionality Declining	20
Shift From Conditionality Toward Recipient Ownership.....	22
Political Conditionality Declining	23
Aid Not Conditioned on Environmental Policy.....	24
IMF Conditionality Limited to Repayment	25
AT: Conditionality Exists Now – Adding New Conditions Counterproductive	26
*Types of Conditionality"	29
Conditionality is Either Pre Conditions or Sanctions	30
Distinction Between Ex Ante/Ex Post Conditionality	31
AFFIRMATIVE	33
Should Reject Aid Conditionality Completely	34
Should Reject Aid Conditionality	35
Conditionality Should Only Be Used as a Last Resort.....	37
Conditionality Undermines Effective Foreign Policy/Alternatives.....	38
Conditionality Undermines Constructive Engagement	41
Unnecessary Conditionality Undermines Credibility of Necessary Conditionality	42
Presumption Against Conditionality.....	43
Presumption Against Political Conditionality	45
Should Reject Conditionality if it is Proven Ineffective.....	46
Alternative Aid Mechanisms Obviate the Need for Conditionality.....	47
Conditionality Turns/Counterproductive	48
Conditionality Counterproductive : Front Line	49
Ext: Shifts Blame for Problems to the Donor	51
Ext: Decreases Government Commitment to Reforms.....	52
Ext: Decreases Government Commitment to Reforms AT: “Turn- Conditionality Strengthens Reformers”	54
Ext: Decreases Indigenous Support for Reforms.....	56
Conditionality Counterproductive: Undermines Government Ownership of Reforms	57
Conditionality Fails Without Government “Ownership” of the Reforms	59
Political Conditionality Counterproductive to Democracy: Front Line	62
Ext: Undermines Governance Capacity.....	64
Ext: Undermines Credibility of Democracy	66
Ext: Encourages Sham Reforms/Shallow Democracy.....	67

Ext: Increases Fragmentation/Mobilizes Opposition.....	69
Accountability Conditions Counterproductive	70
Conditionality Counterproductive in Conflict Zones	71
Conditionality Counterproductive to Promote Development Goals.....	72
Conditionality Ineffective	73
Conditionality Ineffective: Front Line.....	74
Ext: Empirical Record p. 1/2	76
Ext: Empirical Record- African Experience Proves	79
Ext: Empirical Record - AT: Examples of Empirical Success with Conditionality	80
Ext: Recipients Manipulate the Donors	81
Ext: Unsustainable-Backsliding/Slippage.....	83
Ext: Lack of Donor Coordination	85
Ext: Fungibility p. 1/2	87
Ext: Threat Not Credible.....	89
Ext: Military Assistance Swamps Conditioning Democracy Assistance	91
Ext: Lack Country-Specific Expertise in the Issue Areas.....	92
Conditionality Fails to Promote Democracy: Front Line	93
Ext: No Empirical Record of Success.....	95
Ext: Can't Promote Democracy Through Non-Democratic Means.....	96
Ext: Democracy Can't Be Imposed from the Outside	97
Ext: Political Conditionality No More Likely to Succeed than Economic Conditionality.....	99
Conditionality Fails to Promote Good Governance.....	100
Conditionality Fails to Promote Judicial Reforms.....	103
Conditionality Fails to Promote Security (Peace Conditionality Fails).....	104
Conditionality Ineffective: Fails to Promote Development Goals.....	107
Conditionality Ineffective: Fails to Promote Human Rights	109
Conditional Debt Relief Fails	110
Specific Types of Conditionality Ineffective	111
-Should Not Employ Preconditions-	112
Pre Conditions Conditionality is Normal Means	113
Ex Ante Conditionality Fails	115
Short-Leash Conditionality Fails	117
Preconditions Delay Necessary Aid.....	118
Multiple Tranches Effective	119
AT: Preconditions Effective – Advantages Difficult to Achieve	121
-Performance Based Conditionality Bad-	122
Multiple Workability/Implementation Problems.....	123
Does Not Increase Reforms	126
Blames Recipients.....	127
-Ex Post Conditionality Bad-	128
Ex Post Fails: Implementation Difficulties.....	129
Ex Post Conditionality Counterproductive	130
Exacerbates Poverty/Unethical to Not Aid Them.....	131
Unconditional Aid Best.....	132
Unconditional Aid Best for Recipient Governments	133
Unconditional Aid Best: Alternatives More Effective.....	134

Unconditional Aid Solvency: Persuasion More Effective	136
Unconditional Aid Solvency: Persuasion Best for Promoting Pro-Poor Agenda	139
Unconditional Aid Solvency: Markets More Effective	140
Unconditional Aid Solvency: Development Contracts More Effective	141
Unconditional Aid Solvency: Agreed Conditionality More Effective	142
Unconditional Aid Solvency: Better Promotes Good Governance.....	143
Unconditional Aid Solvency: Best to Promote Democracy	145
Unconditional Aid Solvency: Best to Achieve Development Goals	146
Unconditional Aid Solvency: Superior Ontology.....	147
Unconditional Aid Solvency: Best in Long Term	149
Unconditional Aid Solvency: General Budget Support Best.....	150
AT: "Conditionality Necessary to Solve"	151
AT: All Aid Conditional – Only Difference is Whether Its Explicit.....	153
AT: Can Fix the Problems with Conditional Aid	156
Conditionality Unethical	158
Conditionality Generally Immoral/Unethical	159
Conditioning Food Aid Bad.....	161
Food Aid Should be Unconditional	162
Should Exempt Poverty Programs from Conditionality	163
Conditionality Hurts the Poor	164
Humanitarian Assistance is a Moral Imperative.....	165
Poverty Assistance is a Moral Imperative	167
Conditionality Bad	169
Aid Conditionality Snowballs.....	170
Conditionality Bad: Violates Sovereignty	171
Conditionality Violates Sovereignty : Political and Security Conditionality Links	174
Conditionality Violates Sovereignty : Anti-Corruption Conditionality Links	176
Conditionality Violates Sovereignty : Anti-Corruption Conditionality Is Imperialist ...	178
Conditionality Violates Sovereignty –Requires Monitoring	180
Conditionality Violates Sovereignty – Counterproductive to Political Reform	181
Conditionality Violates Sovereignty – Persuasion Better for Sovereignty.....	182
Conditionality Violates Sovereignty – Justifies Rejection	183
Conditionality Violates Sovereignty – AT: "Human Rights Trump Sovereignty"	184
Conditionality Bad: Coercion	185
Conditionality Bad: Political Conditionality Coercive	191
Conditionality Bad: Coercion – Expanding Conditions Increases Risks of Mistakes....	192
Conditionality Bad: Coercion – Only Works in Unequal Power Relationships	193
Conditionality Bad: Coercion – Tool of Hegemonic Domination.....	194
Conditionality Bad: Coercion – Is Colonialist.....	199
Conditionality Bad: Coercion – Undermines Effectiveness	200
Conditionality Bad: Coercion – Should Seek Non-Coercive Alternatives.....	201
Conditionality Bad: Coercion – Aid Through PRSP Process Solves Coercion.....	202
Conditionality Bad: Coercion – AT – They want the plan	204
Conditionality Bad: Coercion – AT – "They Consented to the Conditions"	206
Conditionality Bad: Coercion – AT – "Reforms Have Decreased Coercion"	207
Conditionality Bad: Paternalist.....	208

Conditionality Bad: FDI – Undermines Signaling that is Key to FDI.....	209
Conditionality Bad: Capitalism – Masks Role of Global Capitalism in Recipient Woes	210
Conditionality Bad: Undermines International Law.....	212
Conditionality Bad: Hurts Relations with Recipient Government	213
Conditionality Bad: Hurts NGOs.....	215
Conditionality Bad: Reinforces Statism.....	216
Conditionality Bad: Politics—Unconditional Aid Not Politically Popular	217
AT: Conditionality Good Arguments	218
-AT Chinese Soft Power Good-.....	219
China Courts Ties with Mexico to Challenge US Regional Hegemony.....	220
China Uses Soft Power to Fuel its Rise	221
Chinese Uses Soft Power to Challenge US.....	222
Chinese Role Challenges US Leadership in Latin America	223
Chinese Role in Latin America Threatens US Security Interests	224
Chinese Role in Latin America Threatens Taiwan	225
Chinese Role in Latin America Fuels Military Ties	226
AT: Chinese Role in Latin America Good: Aid Effective.....	227
AT: Chinese Role in Latin America Good: Aid Not Conditioned.....	228
Corruption Good	229
Anti-Corruption Conditions Counterproductive.....	230
Corruption Good: Promotes/Strengthens Democracy	232
Corruption Good: Key to Political Order.....	235
Corruption Good: Decreases Ethnic Violence.....	236
Corruption Good: Decreases Ethnic Violence – Afghan Specific.....	237
Corruption Good: Promotes Peace and Stability	238
Corruption Good: Promotes Economic Growth	239
Corruption Good: Promotes Economic Growth – Afghan Specific	243
Corruption Good: Promotes Economic Growth – Middle Class	244
Corruption Good – Key to Stable Development.....	245
AT: Corruption Hurts Growth and Development.....	247
Corruption Harms Exaggerated	248
Corruption Bad Arguments Wrong: Context Key-Can't Make Generalizations.....	249
Corruption Bad Arguments Wrong: Doesn't Hurt Afghan Development.....	251
Anti-Corruption Efforts Increase Risk of War.....	252
Anti-Corruption Efforts Increase Risk of War: Conditionality	253
Anti-Corruption Efforts Hegemonic	254
Anti-Corruption Efforts Promote Neo-Liberalism.....	255
Anti-Corruption Efforts Undermine Democracy	257
Anti-Corruption Efforts Imperialist.....	259
Anti-Corruption Efforts Increase Economic Harms	260
NEGATIVE	261
Conditionality Good.....	262
Political Conditionality Critical to Success of Aid.....	263
Increases Domestic Support for Reforms	264
Conditionality Vital to Existence of Assistance	267

AT: Undermines Ownership.....	268
AT: Causes Recipients to Try to Get the Most for Reforms.....	269
AT: Moral Hazard.....	270
Pro Forma Conditionality Legitimate.....	271
Pro Forma Conditionality Not Harmful.....	272
Good Governance Conditionality Just.....	273
Good Governance Conditionality Legitimate.....	274
Good Governance Conditionality Effective.....	275
Good Governance Conditionality Key to Reducing Poverty.....	276
Good Governance Conditionality Good – Should Not Remove Conditions.....	277
Good Governance Conditionality Good – Justified for Cuba and Venezuela.....	278
Can Increase Effectiveness of Political Conditionality.....	281
Peace Conditionality Effective.....	283
Poverty-Reduction Conditionality Justified.....	285
Fiduciary Conditionality Justified.....	286
Conditionality Bad Arguments Not Competitive.....	287
Conditionality Bad Arguments Not Unique – Inevitable.....	288
AT: Conditionality Violates Sovereignty.....	289
AT: Conditionality is Coercive.....	291
AT: Conditionality Undermines Other Aid Strategies.....	292
Conditionality Ethically Justified.....	294
Conditionality Ethically Justified- Anti-Human Trafficking Conditions.....	296
AT: Conditionality Harms the Innocent to Punish Regimes.....	297
Alternatives Fail: Persuasion.....	298
Alternatives Fail: Difficult to Implement.....	299
-Conditionality Increases US Hegemony-.....	300
Unconditional Aid Undermines Hegemony.....	301
-Conditionality Increases Chinese Soft Power-.....	302
China Provides Alternative to Conditioned Aid.....	303
Chinese Soft Power Good: Prevents Asian Conflicts.....	305
China Plays Key Role in Economies of Mexico, Cuba and Venezuela.....	306
Chinese/Latin American Ties Beneficial.....	307
Constructing China as a Threat Dangerous.....	308
China Not Challenging US.....	309
Chinese Soft Power Not A Challenge to US.....	312
Chinese Leadership Not A Challenge to US.....	314
Chinese/Latin American Ties Not a Threat to US Interests.....	316
China Presence in Latin America Not a Challenge to US.....	318
Specific Types of Conditionality Effective.....	320
* Should Employ Pre-Conditions-.....	321
Preconditions More Effective.....	322
Preconditions Better for Predictability of Funding.....	323
Preconditions Better for the Poor.....	324
Preconditions Better for Sovereignty.....	325
Multiple Tranches Ineffective.....	326
-Performance Based Conditionality Good-.....	327

Empirically Effective	328
MCC Effective	329
Better Promotes Ownership	330
Better For Sovereignty	331
Best for Poverty Reduction	332
Should Shift to Performance Assessment	333
Should Allow Recipients Choice of Policies	334
-Ex Post Conditionality Good-.....	335
Ex Post Option Competitive with Conditionality	336
Ex Ante Encourages Misallocation of Resources	338
Ex Post More Effective	339
Ex Post Better Promotes Ownership	341
Ex Post Employs Positive Incentives.....	343
Ex Post Relies on Performance Evaluation	344
Should Shift to Ex Post	345
AT: Exacerbates Poverty/Abandons the Poor.....	346
Corruption Bad – Anti-Corruption Efforts Good.....	347
Conditioning Aid on Reduced Corruption Good/Necessary	348
Conditioning Aid on Reduced Corruption Justified for Mexico	349
Corruption Bad: Increases Conflict	350
Corruption Bad: Increases Terrorism.....	353
Corruption Bad: Undermines Democracy	354
Corruption Bad: Undermines Economic Development and Growth	356
Corruption Bad: Inequality Trap/Blocks Necessary Reforms	357
Corruption Bad: Undermines Support for Assistance	358
Corruption Bad: Regressive, Exacerbates Inequalities	359
Corruption Bad: Negative Effects Outweigh Positives	360
Challenging Corruption/Promoting Democracy Key to Survival.....	364
Afghani Corruption Bad: Increases Conflict	365
Afghani Corruption Bad – No Development Without Addressing Corruption	366
Afghani Corruption Bad – Serious Security Threat.....	368
Afghani Corruption Bad – AT: Key to Maintaining Political Stability	370
Mexican Corruption Bad: State Failure	371
Mexican Corruption Bad: Undermines Security Cooperation.....	372
Mexican Corruption Bad: Undermines Economy.....	373
Mexican Corruption Bad- AT: "Corruption Good"	375
African Corruption Bad: Undermines Democracy	376
Increased Democratization Key to Reducing Corruption	377
Should Increase Anti-Corruption Assistance.....	378
Anti-Corruption Efforts Effective: General	379
Anti-Corruption Efforts Effective: US Key	380
Anti-Corruption Efforts Effective: Assistance Effective	381
Anti-Corruption Efforts Effective – in Africa	382
Anti-Corruption Efforts Key to Effective Development	383